1989 Paper 1 Q16

Year: 1989
Paper: 1
Question Number: 16

Course: LFM Stats And Pure
Section: Conditional Probability

Difficulty: 1516.0 Banger: 1470.2

Problem

A and B play a guessing game. Each simultaneously names one of the numbers \(1,2,3.\) If the numbers differ by 2, whoever guessed the smaller pays the opponent £\(2\). If the numbers differ by 1, whoever guessed the larger pays the opponent £\(1.\) Otherwise no money changes hands. Many rounds of the game are played.
  1. If A says he will always guess the same number \(N\), explain (for each value of \(N\)) how B can maximise his winnings.
  2. In an attempt to improve his play, A announces that he will guess each number at random with probability \(\frac{1}{3},\) guesses on different rounds being independent. To counter this, B secretly decides to guess \(j\) with probability \(b_{j}\) (\(j=1,2,3,\, b_{1}+b_{2}+b_{3}=1\)), guesses on different rounds being independent. Derive an expression for B's expected winnings on any round. How should the probabilities \(b_{j}\) be chosen so as to maximize this expression?
  3. A now announces that he will guess \(j\) with probability \(a_{j}\) (\(j=1,2,3,\, a_{1}+a_{2}+a_{3}=1\)). If B guesses \(j\) with probability \(b_{j}\) (\(j=1,2,3,\, b_{1}+b_{2}+b_{3}=1\)), obtain an expression for his expected winnings in the form \[ Xa_{1}+Ya_{2}+Za_{3}. \] Show that he can choose \(b_{1},b_{2}\) and \(b_{3}\) such that \(X,Y\) and \(Z\) are all non-negative. Deduce that, whatever values for \(a_{j}\) are chosen by A, B can ensure that in the long run he loses no money.

Solution

  1. Suppose A always plays \(1\), then B should always play \(2\) and every time they will win 1. Suppose A always plays \(2\) then B should always play \(3\) and every time they will win 1. If A always plays \(3\) then B should always play \(1\) and every time they will win 2.
  2. \begin{array}{cccc} & b_1 & b_2 & b_3 \\ \frac13 & (0, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (1, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (-2, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\ \frac13 & (-1, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (0, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (1, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\ \frac13 & (2, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (-1, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (0, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\ \end{array} Therefore the expected value is: \(\frac{b_1}{3} - \frac{b_3}{3}\) and to maximise this he should always guess \(1\) (ie \(b_1 = 1, b_2 = 0, b_3 = 0\).)
  3. \begin{array}{cccc} & b_1 & b_2 & b_3 \\ a_1 & (0, a_1b_1) & (1, a_1b_2) & (-2, a_1b_3) \\ a_2 & (-1, a_2b_1) & (0, a_2b_2) & (1, a_2b_3) \\ a_3 & (2, a_3b_1) & (-1, a_3b_2) & (0, a_3b_3) \\ \end{array} Therefore the expected value is: \((b_2-2b_3)a_1 + (b_3-b_1)a_2 + (2b_1-b_2)a_3\) We need \(b_2 \geq 2b_3, b_3 \geq b_1, 2b_1 \geq b_2\) so \(b_1 \leq b_3 \leq \frac12 b_2 \leq b_1\) so we could take \(b_1 = b_3 = \frac12 b_2\) or \(b_1 = b_3 = \frac14, b_2 = \frac12\) and all values would be \(0\). Therefore by choosing these values \(B\) can guarantee his expected value is \(0\) and therefore shouldn't expect to lose money in the long run.
Rating Information

Difficulty Rating: 1516.0

Difficulty Comparisons: 1

Banger Rating: 1470.2

Banger Comparisons: 4

Show LaTeX source
Problem source
A and B play a guessing game. Each simultaneously names one of the numbers $1,2,3.$ If the numbers differ by 2, whoever guessed the smaller pays the opponent £$2$. If the numbers differ by 1, whoever guessed the larger pays the opponent £$1.$
Otherwise no money changes hands. Many rounds of the game are played. 
\begin{questionparts}
\item If A says he will always guess the same number $N$, explain (for each value of $N$) how B can maximise his winnings. 
\item In an attempt to improve his play, A announces that he will guess each number at random with probability $\frac{1}{3},$ guesses on different rounds being independent. To counter this, B secretly decides
to guess $j$ with probability $b_{j}$ ($j=1,2,3,\, b_{1}+b_{2}+b_{3}=1$), guesses on different rounds being independent. Derive an expression for B's expected winnings on any round. How should the probabilities $b_{j}$ be chosen so as to maximize this expression? 
\item A now announces that he will guess $j$ with probability $a_{j}$ ($j=1,2,3,\, a_{1}+a_{2}+a_{3}=1$). If B guesses $j$ with probability $b_{j}$ ($j=1,2,3,\, b_{1}+b_{2}+b_{3}=1$), obtain an expression for his expected winnings in the form 
\[
Xa_{1}+Ya_{2}+Za_{3}.
\]
Show that he can choose $b_{1},b_{2}$ and $b_{3}$ such that $X,Y$ and $Z$ are all non-negative. Deduce that, whatever values for $a_{j}$ are chosen by A, B can ensure that in the long run he loses no money.
 \end{questionparts}
Solution source
\begin{questionparts}
\item Suppose A always plays $1$, then B should always play $2$ and every time they will win 1.
Suppose A always plays $2$ then B should always play $3$ and every time they will win 1.
If A always plays $3$ then B should always play $1$ and every time they will win 2.

\item 
\begin{array}{cccc}
& b_1 & b_2 & b_3 \\
\frac13 & (0, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (1, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (-2, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\
\frac13 & (-1, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (0, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (1, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\
\frac13 & (2, \frac{b_1}{3}) & (-1, \frac{b_2}{3}) & (0, \frac{b_3}{3}) \\
\end{array}

Therefore the expected value is: $\frac{b_1}{3} - \frac{b_3}{3}$ and to maximise this he should always guess $1$ (ie $b_1 = 1, b_2 = 0, b_3 = 0$.)

\item \begin{array}{cccc}
& b_1 & b_2 & b_3 \\
a_1 & (0, a_1b_1) & (1, a_1b_2) & (-2, a_1b_3) \\
a_2 & (-1, a_2b_1) & (0, a_2b_2) & (1, a_2b_3) \\
a_3 & (2, a_3b_1) & (-1, a_3b_2) & (0, a_3b_3) \\
\end{array}

Therefore the expected value is:

$(b_2-2b_3)a_1 + (b_3-b_1)a_2 + (2b_1-b_2)a_3$

We need $b_2 \geq 2b_3, b_3 \geq b_1, 2b_1 \geq b_2$ so $b_1 \leq b_3 \leq \frac12 b_2 \leq b_1$ so we could take $b_1 = b_3 = \frac12 b_2$ or $b_1 = b_3 = \frac14, b_2 = \frac12$ and all values would be $0$.

Therefore by choosing these values $B$ can guarantee his expected value is $0$ and therefore shouldn't expect to lose money in the long run.
\end{questionparts}